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This paper deals with the principle of complementarity as one of the most important principles 
governing the functioning of the International Criminal Court. The purpose of this principle is to 
delineate the jurisdiction of the Court from that of States. However, despite the relatively clear 
guidelines set in article 17 of the Rome Statue, the application of this principle has already proven to 
be difficult in practice. The authors analyze the development of the twofold test in the case law of the 
International Criminal Court, starting with the requirement of ongoing proceedings and then moving 
to the notions of unwillingness and inability. Special emphasis is given to the issue of due process and 
to the controversial claim that unfair proceedings at the national level should, in themselves, render 
the case admissible before the ICC. 
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1. INSTEAD OF AN INTRODUCTION: THE MEANING AND IMPORTANCE OF 
COMPLEMENTARITY 
The International Criminal Court (hereinafter: the ICC, the Court) is a permanent court 
established by an international treaty with the power to prosecute perpetrators of the 
most serious international crimes. Its jurisdiction is complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions.1 This means that, unlike the ad hoc international criminal tribunals, the ICC 
does not have primacy over national courts nor does it have exclusive jurisdiction over 
international crimes. States are the ones that have not just the principal right but also the 
duty to prosecute international crimes.2 Yet, the Court`s existence would be meaningless 
if, under certain conditions, it could not step in and exercise its complementary 
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1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, entered into force on July 1 2002, art. 1. 
2 Yang, Lijun, On the Principle of Complementarity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
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jurisdiction. In order to fulfil its purpose, the Court must be able to intervene “when States 
do not or cannot investigate and, where necessary, prosecute”.3 
The principle of complementarity underpins the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court and is often highlighted as “the cornerstone of the functioning of the 
Court”.4 It aims at “strik[ing] a balance between safeguarding the primacy of domestic 
proceedings vis-à-vis the International Criminal Court on the one hand, and the goal of the 
Rome Statute to 'put an end to impunity' on the other hand”.5 The function of 
complementarity is not only to (strictly) monitor state action and establish whether it is 
for the Court or for a State to act in a specific case, but also to serve as a tool for managerial 
interaction between the Court and States.6 Broadly speaking, it is a principle which 
regulates the relationship and the interplay between the Court and States Parties when 
dealing with international crimes. Hence, in a way, the principle of complementarity 
governs the functioning of the entire system established by the Rome Statute. 
Questions about the legal nature and practical meaning of the principle of 
complementarity have been attracting the attention of scholars and practitioners alike for 
more than a decade now.7 However, despite considerable academic attention, the debate 
is still ongoing. The first decisions on this matter unfortunately failed to provide a deeper 
theoretical understanding of the principle and to give clear guidelines for its application.8 
Some recent decisions offered a more comprehensive view,9 yet many problems still need 
to be tackled, as was shown afresh in the new decision with respect to Libya.  
                                                        
3 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (hereinafter Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui), 
ICC-01/04-01/07-1497, 25 September 2009, § 85. 
4 Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen (hereinafter Prosecutor v. Kony 
et al.), ICC-02/04-01/05-377, § 34. 
5 Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui, § 85. 
6 Stahn, Carsten, Complementarity: A Tale of Two Notions, Criminal Law Forum, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2008, p. 88. 
7 Cf. El Zeidy, Mohamed M., The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement International 
Criminal Law, 23 Michigan Journal of International Law, 869, 2001-2002; Burke-White, William W., 
Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of 
International Justice, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2008. 
8 Prosecutor v. Kony et al., ICC-02/04-01/05-1-US-Exp, 8 July 2005, p. 2; Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
(hereinafter: Prosecutor v. Lubanga), ICC-01/04-01/06-8-Corr., 09 March 2006, pp. 19-33; Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-169, 23 September 2009 (pursuant to Decision ICC-01/04-
538-PUB-Exp reclassified as public, decision under seal was rendered 13 July 2006) §§ 42-53 and 68-83. 
For a more detailed account of the earlier jurisprudence of the ICC, see: Batros, Ben, The Evolution of the ICC 
Jurisprudence on Admissibility in C. Stahn, M. El Zeidy (eds.), The International Criminal Court and 
Complementarity: From Theory to Practice, Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
9 Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali (hereinafter 
Prosecutor v. Muthaura et al.), ICC-01/09-02/11-274, 30 August 2011; Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, 
Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang (hereinafter Prosecutor v. Ruto et al.), ICC-01/09-01/11-307, 
30 August 2011. Some of the issues re-emerged in the case Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah 
Al-Senussi (hereinafter Prosecutor v. Gaddafi ) ICC-01/11-01/11 with respect to Libya. 
Konforta, Munivrana Vajda: The principle of complementarity… 11 
This paper will focus on substantive requirements which serve to delineate national 
jurisdictions from the jurisdiction of the Court, as set forth in article 17 (1) (a) and (b) of 
the Rome Statute. Although it does not exhaust the principle of complementarity, article 
17 of the Rome Statute can be seen as its “centrepiece”.10 
2. COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE AND CASE LAW OF THE ICC 
2.1. Complementarity as part of the admissibility test: interpreting article 17 
Complementarity is regulated by the Statute’s provisions on the admissibility of a case 
(articles 17 – 20 of the Rome Statute) and thus it belongs to the broader issue of 
admissibility rather than jurisdiction.11 When analyzing the relationship between 
complementarity, admissibility and jurisdiction, the Court determined that: 
“complementarity is the principle reconciling the States' persisting duty to exercise 
jurisdiction over international crimes with the establishment of a permanent 
international criminal court having competence over the same crimes; admissibility is the 
criterion which enables the determination, in respect of a given case, whether it is for a 
national jurisdiction or for the Court to proceed. Accordingly, admissibility can be 
regarded as the tool allowing the implementation of the principle of complementarity in 
respect of a specific scenario”.12 
By regulating the substantive requirements for the inadmissibility of a case, article 17 
gives effect to the principle of complementarity. The requirements set in article 17 apply 
to preliminary admissibility rulings (art. 18), to the challenges to the admissibility of a 
case before the Court (art. 19), and also to the Prosecutor’s decisions to initiate an 
investigation under article 53 (1) and (2).13 Articles 18 and 19 provide the procedural 
framework for admissibility determinations, although, depending on the stage of 
proceedings and the specific issue, other articles may come into play as well.  
The admissibility test, set down in article 17, consists of two main prongs – the first is 
complementarity, regulated by article 17 (1) (a) to (c),14 and the second is gravity, 
governed by article 17 (1) (d).15 Although part of the admissibility test, gravity itself is not 
                                                        
10 Robinson, Darryl, Three Theories of Complementarity: Charge, Sentence, or Process?, Harvard International 
Law Journal Online, Volume 53, April 2012, p. 177. 
11 Pichon, Jakob, The Principle of Complementarity in the Cases of the Sudanese Nationals Ahmad Harun and 
Ali Kushayb before the International Criminal Court, International Criminal Law Review, Vol. 8, No.1-2, 2008, 
p. 188. 
12 Prosecutor v. Kony et al., supra note 4, § 34. 
13 Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., ICC-01/09-01/11-307, 30 August 2011, § 38. 
14 The Appeals Chamber in the case Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-772, 14 December 2006, § 23, 
distinguished between complementarity, as encompassing article 17 (1) (a) to (b), and the ne bis in idem 
principle, contained in subparagraph (c). Therefore, although subparagraph (c) also serves as a substantive 
requirement delineating the jurisdictions, it can be seen as a distinct part of the admissibility test, separate 
from complementarity. 
15 Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-101, 30 May 2011, § 47. 
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relevant for the issue of complementarity and, therefore, will not be discussed further in 
this paper.  
The first prong of the “admissibility test”, complementarity, encompasses three situations 
in which a case is inadmissible: 
a) it is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, 
unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution (art. 17 (1) (a));  
b) it has been investigated by a State with jurisdiction which decided not to prosecute 
the person concerned, unless the “decision resulted from the unwillingness or 
inability ... genuinely to prosecute” (art. 17 (1) (b));  
c) the person concerned has already been tried for the conduct in question and a trial 
by the Court is not allowed under the Statute’s ne bis in idem rules (art. 17 (1) (c)).16 
2.1.1. A twofold test for complementarity – the “proceedings requirement” 
Complementarity itself contains a further test consisting of two “folds” or steps (the 
twofold test).17 The Court must first determine:  
a) whether there is an ongoing investigation or prosecution in a State, or an 
investigation or prosecution existed in the past (the so-called “proceedings 
requirement”18); 
and only when the answer to this question is positive, 
b) whether the investigating or prosecuting state is willing and able genuinely to 
carry out the proceedings. 
The twofold test, however, has not been accepted without significant controversy. 
Supporters of the so-called single-fold test on one side,19 and those in favour of the 
twofold test, on the other,20 have engaged in a long debate on the correct approach to 
determinations of inadmissibility on grounds of complementarity. The former suggest 
that a case should be admissible before the Court only when the State with jurisdiction is 
                                                        
16 Article 17 stipulates the requirements under which the case is inadmissible before the Court, not the 
requirements for the case to be admissible before the Court. As Robinson states, this is a subtle point, but a 
noteworthy one nevertheless. Robinson, Darryl, The Mysterious Mysteriousness of Complementarity, 
Criminal Law Forum, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2010, p. 4. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1559403. 
Accessed on 23 October 2012. Regarding the ne bis in idem principle, see also footnote 14.  
17 Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., supra note 15, § 47; Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui, supra note 3, § 78. 
18 Robinson, 2010, p. 2. 
19 Arsanjani Mahnoush H., Weisman, W. Michael, The Law-in-Action of the International Criminal Court, 2005, 
Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 1001. Available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fs 
s_papers/1001 on 23 October 2010.  
20 Robinson, 2010, pp. 15-25. For a detailed analysis of article 17 and whether to accept the single or twofold 
test, see: El Zeidy, Mohamed M., The Ugandan Government Triggers the First Test of the Complementarity 
Principle: An Assessment of the First State’s Party Referral to the ICC, International Criminal Law Review, Vol. 
5, No. 1, 2005, pp. 99-105.  
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unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the proceedings.21 Accordingly, even in cases 
of State inaction, the Court should take into consideration un/willingness or in/ability, so 
the case cannot be found admissible before the Court merely on the ground of State 
inactivity. A form of this single-fold test was highlighted by Katanga’s defence in support 
of the appeal against the decision of the Trial Chamber on the admissibility challenge in 
the case of Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui.22 The defence stated that it would 
discourage States from prosecuting domestically and would thereby endanger the correct 
application of the principle of complementarity if the Court was to accept the view that a 
State which is able to prosecute is fulfilling its duty to prosecute international crimes by 
transferring cases to the Court and by fully cooperating with it.23 According to this 
argument, the Court should intercede only when a State is genuinely unwilling or unable 
to take action to support the prosecution of the crimes. Therefore, genuine willingness 
and ability to carry out proceedings would have to be taken into account even in cases of 
inaction.  
The suggestion that a State not conducting any proceedings is in fact unwilling, and the 
view that inaction on the part of the State is a subset of unwillingness, has also arisen, and 
can even be detected in some Court decisions.24 For instance, the Trial Chamber noted 
that DR Congo is “quite clearly unwilling to prosecute the case”25 and hence dismissed the 
admissibility challenge. It also mentioned the importance of determining the “intentions 
of the State to institute proceedings against the persons in question”.26 However, the 
implicit hint in favour of the single-fold test by the Trial Chamber in this decision was 
clearly rejected later, first by the Appeals Chamber in the same case and then by the Pre-
Trial Chamber in its decisions on the admissibility challenge in the two Kenyan cases.27 
The debate has, thus, seemingly found closure in confirmation of the twofold test by the 
Court. 
The Court established that “in case of inaction, the question of unwillingness or inability 
does not arise”.28 It has underscored that States` unwillingness or inability genuinely to 
carry out proceedings, contained in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of article 17, cannot be the 
                                                        
21 Arsanjani et al., 2005, pp. 385-387. 
22 Mr. Katanga`s defence elaborated the argument in the document submitted in support of the appeal 
against the Trial Chambers` decision on admissibility: Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-
1279, 8 July 2009, §§ 62 -72. It was later rejected by the Appeals Chamber. See supra note 3. 
23 Ibid. See also Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-67-ENG, 12 June 2009, p. 8. For a more 
detailed discussion on applying complementarity through waiver, see: El Zeidy, 2005, pp. 83-120. 
24 See, e.g., the oral decision of the Court’s Trial Chamber in the case Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui, ICC-
01/04-01/07-T-67-ENG, 12 June 2009, p. 10. 
25 Ibid. Further, for a more detailed critique of the Decision, see: Robinson, 2010, p. 13. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Pre-Trial Chamber II found: “Thus, while the Chamber welcomes the express will of the Government of 
Kenya to investigate the case sub judice, as well as its prior and proposed undertakings, the Chamber's 
determination on the subject-matter of the present challenge is ultimately dictated by the facts presented 
and the legal parameters embodied in the Court's statutory provisions”. Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., supra note 
15, § 45. 
28 Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui, supra note 3, § 78. The Pre-Trial Chamber accepted the twofold test early 
in the Court`s practice. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-8-US-Corr, 10 February 2006, § 29. 
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starting point when determining whether the case is inadmissible because 
complementarity concerns, first and foremost, “the existence or absence of national 
proceedings”.29 The Court can turn to the willingness and ability of the State genuinely to 
carry out the proceedings only when it determines that national proceedings of a certain 
quality exist. In other words, even when a State is willing and able genuinely to carry out 
the proceedings, if the “proceedings requirement” is not fulfilled, the case is admissible 
and the ICC can take over.30 This conclusion clearly follows from the text of article 17, 
subparagraphs (a) and (b), which states: “[t]he case is being investigatedor prosecuted, 
unless...” and “[t]he case has been investigated, unless...”.31 The same conclusion is also 
supported by teleological interpretation and the overall goal of the Rome Statute – putting 
an end to impunity – which cannot be achieved if the State is inactive, regardless of 
whether it is willing or able to prosecute. As the Appeals Chamber pointed out, if the 
opposite interpretation were accepted, “[t]he Court would be unable to exercise its 
jurisdiction as long as the State is theoretically willing and able to investigate and 
prosecute the case, even though the State has no intention of doing so”. This would lead 
to “thousands of victims…. denied justice”.32 
Yet, although the twofold test is clearly supported by the text of article 17, it can be 
legitimately criticized for the fact that it separates States` inaction from unwillingness or 
inability in a way that can create tensions with the duty of every State to prosecute 
international crimes and the role of the ICC as the Court of “last resort”.33 States may 
(temporarily) refrain from prosecuting core crimes for various reasons that go beyond 
“inability” or “unwillingness”, such as various political, financial, logistical, local, or even 
external reasons. In addition, by failing to prosecute, States can purposely render cases 
admissible before the ICC. This can defeat the whole purpose of the complementarity 
mechanism,34 especially if we bear in mind the possibility of self-referrals, and the ability 
of governments to selectively externalize difficult cases, thus relieving themselves of the 
pressure to prosecute the crimes enumerated in the Statute.35 Notwithstanding this 
undesirable corollary of the prevailing interpretation of article 17, the only reasonable 
approach to this article is that the case can be found admissible before the ICC whenever 
national proceedings are not ongoing,36 without the need to discuss the willingness or 
ability of the relevant State and without having to consider the reasons behind the State’s 
                                                        
29 Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui, supra note 3, § 78, confirmed in: Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., supra note 17, 
§ 48; Prosecutor v. Muthaura et al., ICC-01/09-02/11-96, 30 May 2011, § 44. 
30 Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui, supra note 3, §§ 74 – 79. 
31 See Robinson, 2010, pp. 3-4. 
32 Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui, supra note 3, § 79. 
33 Jurdi, Nidal Nabil, Some Lessons on Complementarity for the International Criminal Court Review 
Conference, The South African Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 34, 2009, pp. 28-56, p. 31. 
34 Ibid., p. 31. 
35 Arsanjani et al., 2005, p. 390. 
36 And have not been conducted in the past.  
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decision not to prosecute. To scrutinize “willingness” or “ability” in the absence of ongoing 
or past proceedings would indeed mean “to put the cart before the horse”.37 
However, this conclusion has recently been called into question by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber`s Decision on Libya`s challenge38 which reopened a number of different issues 
and again muddied the waters surrounding the practical application of complementarity. 
The Court declaratively upheld the twofold test and clearly stated that it must first 
establish the existence of proceedings and only then may it proceed to the second prong 
of the test;39 yet, it went on to discuss Libya’s ability to carry out proceedings despite its 
findings that Libya has not demonstrated that it is investigating the same case as the 
Court.40 It remains to be seen whether the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision will be upheld or 
overturned on appeal. 
2.1.1.1. The “same person/same conduct” test 
According to the text of subparagraphs (a) and (b) of article 17, national proceedings 
encompass both investigation and prosecution conducted at the national level. The 
Statute, however, does not provide clear and detailed guidelines about actual conditions 
that national proceedings must satisfy in order to comply with the “proceedings 
requirement” under article 17 of the Statute.  
These guidelines have been developed through the ICC’s case law. Today, it is uncontested 
that the “proceedings requirement” will be met only if the national proceedings concern 
the same person and the same conduct (the so-called “same person/same conduct test”). 
According to this test, relevant national proceedings must “cover the same individual and 
substantially the same conduct as alleged in the proceedings before the Court”.41 The 
“same person/same conduct” test can be discerned from the outset; already in Prosecutor 
v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the Pre-Trial Chamber stated that it considers a “conditio sine 
qua non for a case arising from the investigation of a situation to be inadmissible that 
national proceedings encompass both the person and the conduct which is the subject of 
the case before the Court”.42 Since then, the matter has been discussed by several different 
chambers. In Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui the Appeals 
Chamber briefly discussed the test, but declined to rule on the correctness of the “same 
                                                        
37 Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui, supra note 3, § 78. 
38 Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11-344-Red, 31 May 2013. 
39 Ibid., § 89. 
40 Ibid., § 134. 
41 Prosecutor v. Muthaura et al., ICC-01/09-02/11-274, 30 August 2011, § 39. Also, Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, 
ICC-01/11-01/11-344-Red, 31 May 2013, § 61. Additionally, the same person/same conduct test applies to 
the investigative phase as well, since “the issue is not merely one of 'investigation' in the abstract, but is 
whether the same case is being investigated by both the Court and a national jurisdiction”. Prosecutor v. 
Ruto et al., ICC-01/09-01/11-307, 30 August 2011, § 37. 
42 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-8-US-Corr., 9 March 2006, § 31. 
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conduct” part because it was not relevant for the appeal decision in the case before it.43 In 
that case, the Court did not have to decide “whether the case must always concern the 
same person”, since the national proceedings in DR Congo did concern Mr. Katanga.44 
A more comprehensive analysis of the complementarity principle in general, and 
particularly of the same person/same conduct test, was undertaken fairly recently by the 
Appeals Chamber in two Kenyan cases – Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono 
Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang and Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai 
Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, following the appeal against the decision of Pre-Trial 
Chamber II on the admissibility challenge of the Government of Kenya pursuant to article 
19 (2) (b) of the Statute.  
The Appeals Chamber firstly raised a significant point endorsing a distinction in the 
application of article 17 based on the stage of the ICC proceedings.45 It emphasised that 
the “same person/same conduct” test must be applied in the correct context. The phrases 
“case is being investigated or prosecuted” and “case has been investigated” in article 17 
(1) (a) and (b) must be interpreted bearing in mind the different stages of the proceedings 
before the Court (specifically, the differences in the nature of proceedings pursuant to 
articles 15, 18, 19 or 53).46 At the stage of preliminary admissibility proceedings under 
article 18, there will often be no suspects identified and the exact conduct and legal 
classification will be unclear,47 while challenges under article 19 relate to the admissibility 
of a concrete case, as “defined by the warrant of arrest or summons to appear issued 
under article 58, or the charges brought by the Prosecutor and confirmed by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber under article 61”.48 
In the two Kenyan cases the admissibility challenge “was brought under article 19 (2) (b) 
concerning a case in which a summons to appear has been issued against specific suspects 
for specific conduct”.49 In such circumstances, as the Appeals Chamber further explained, 
“the words 'is being investigated' … signify the taking of steps directed at ascertaining 
whether those suspects are responsible for that conduct, for instance by interviewing 
witnesses or suspects, collecting documentary evidence, or carrying out forensic 
analyses”.50 The argument put forth by Kenya that it is sufficient for the national 
investigation into the conduct in question to encompass “persons at the same level in the 
hierarchy being investigated by the ICC” was rejected.51 
                                                        
43 Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui, supra note 3, § 81. The Appeal Chambers decided that at the relevant time 
there were no indications of any investigation or prosecution of any crimes allegedly committed in the DRC, 
§ 80. 
44 Prosecutor v. Muthaura et al., supra note 41, § 34. 
45 Prosecutor v. Muthaura et al., supra note 41, §§ 37 -41; Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., supra note 13, §§ 37-42. 
46 Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., ibid, § 39. 
47 Ibid.;Prosecutor v. Muthaura et al., supra note 41, § 38. 
48 Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., supra note 13, § 40; Prosecutor v. Muthaura et al., ibid, § 39. 
49 Prosecutor v. Muthaura et al., ibid, § 40. 
50 Ibid.; see also Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., supra note 13, § 41. 
51 Ibid., § 32. 
Konforta, Munivrana Vajda: The principle of complementarity… 17 
The Appeals Chamber further upheld the view expressed by Pre-Trial Chamber II that in 
order for a case to be inadmissible before the ICC, concrete investigative steps must be 
undertaken at the national level.52 In other words, an admissibility challenge based on 
judicial reforms and promises of future actions cannot succeed.53 In addition, the Appeals 
Chambers clearly pointed out that in line with the general principle onus probandi actori 
incumbit, when a State challenges the admissibility of a case, it bears the burden of proof 
to demonstrate that the case is inadmissible. In the words of the Appeals Chamber: “[t]o 
discharge that burden, the State must provide the Court with evidence of a sufficient 
degree of specificity and probative value that demonstrates that it is indeed investigating 
the case. It is not sufficient merely to assert that investigations are ongoing”.54 This 
approach has recently been approved by the PTC in the Decision on Libya’s challenge to 
admissibility.55 
One of the issues raised is the fact that, due to the “same conduct” requirement, national 
prosecutors “cannot charge crimes—including serious ones—that involve conduct the 
ICC is not investigating, even if prosecuting different conduct would be far more likely to 
result in a conviction”.56 In such a case, when a State wishes to prosecute the same person, 
but for different conduct, as some argue, the State should rely on part 9 of the Statute 
which concerns international cooperation and judicial assistance.57 This places the issue 
of a State wishing to prosecute what is essentially a different case in the context of the 
entirety of the Statute. In other words, “under the existing Rome Statute regime, 
competing claims concerning different cases are resolved through the consultation 
mechanism, and thus the issue is one of sequencing, i.e., which jurisdiction tries its case”.58 
Part 9 does not offer a perfect solution; some of its provisions are in fact quite ambiguous 
and confusing, but it presents an appropriate framework for the resolution of such 
problems.  
Another question that has been discussed in the literature is whether a prosecution for an 
ordinary crime (e.g. murder) as opposed to prosecution for an international crime would 
satisfy the requirements of the same case? Stahn believes that admissibility should be 
assessed on the basis of a factual determination which then allows the States flexibility 
“since it does not per se require identity in the legal qualification of the criminal 
                                                        
52 Ibid., §§ 62-70. 
53 Hansen believes that Kenya`s reliance on judicial reform as an argument could have resulted from the 
statements of the Pre-Trial Chamber in the case Prosecutor v. Kony et al. referring to an agreement between 
the Ugandan Government and the LRA and the fact it that was not turned into law. See Hansen, Thomas Obel, 
A Critical Review of the ICC`s Recent Practice Concerning Admissibility Challenges and Complementarity, 
Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2012, p. 219. 
54 Prosecutor v. Muthaura et al., supra note 41, § 61. 
55 Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, supra note 38, §§ 52, 54. 
56 Heller Kevin John, A Sentence Based Theory of Complementarity, Harvard International Law Journal, Vo. 
52, No. 1, 2012, p. 239.  
57 Robinson, 2012, pp. 177-180. 
58 Ibid., p. 179. 
18  ZPR 3 (1) 2014; 9-27 
conduct”.59 This approach has been recently approved by the Court in the case of 
Prosecutor v. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi.60 In that case, the Pre-Trial Chamber very clearly 
articulated its view that the assessment of domestic proceedings “should focus on the 
alleged conduct and not its legal characterization”.61 As the PTC further explained, “the 
question of whether domestic investigations are carried out with a view to prosecuting 
‘international crimes’ is not determinative of an admissibility challenge”.62 It follows that 
a domestic investigation or prosecution for "ordinary crimes", to the extent that the case 
covers the same conduct, should be considered sufficient, and the mere fact that the 
national criminal justice system lacks legislation criminalizing international crimes does 
not per se render the case admissible before the Court.63 
A significant, related problem also arises in the context of international crimes, which 
normally encompass a number of different specific incidents or events, as well as a huge 
number of victims. Therefore, and especially when it comes to political and military 
leaders responsible for a wide range of events, it is very likely that different prosecutorial 
authorities will refer to different instances as non-exhaustive examples of individual acts 
constituting international crimes. According to the Pre-Trial Chamber in Libya, this, 
however, does not constitute different conduct.64 The ICC held that it would not be 
appropriate to expect Libya's investigation to cover exactly the same acts of murder and 
persecution mentioned in the article 58 Decision as constituting instances of Mr. Gaddafi's 
alleged course of conduct.65 However, a national investigation needs to encompass “the 
same conduct underlying the Warrant of Arrest and Article 58 Decision”.66 This is 
probably the only possible reasonable approach in line with the purpose of the 
complementarity principle, since interpreting “same conduct” restrictively would in 
practice render almost all or at least most of the cases admissible before the ICC.  
Having in mind all of the above, it may be concluded that in order for the case to be 
inadmissible, proceedings must be ongoing and must concern the same case, i.e. the same 
person and the same conduct. This, however, is not sufficient. In addition, the State must 
be able and willing to carry out the proceedings. This, second prong of the 
complementarity test will be analyzed further below.  
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62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid., § 88.  
64 Ibid., § 83. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., § 83. That conduct, according to the Chamber, is Mr Gaddafi`s use of control over relevant parts of 
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2.1.2. Unwillingness and inability to carry out proceedings 
The second “fold” of the complementarity test, the unwillingness or inability of a State 
with jurisdiction to carry out proceedings, opens a whole new set of issues. At first glance, 
paragraphs (2) and (3) of article 17 give relatively clear guidelines on how they should be 
understood. Practice has, however, shown that the application of the “unwilling or unable” 
test is difficult and complex.  
As mentioned above, unwillingness and inability will only be considered if the 
“proceedings requirement” has been met.67 This has been settled practice of the Court so 
far, although the latest decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber, which rejected the Libyan 
inadmissibility claim, seems to have endorsed a more flexible approach to this question. 
This decision also made it unclear which of the two, unwillingness or inability, should be 
discussed first.68 A possible answer might be that an established order of discussion is not 
even relevant and that it can and should be ascertained on the basis of the specific 
circumstances of a concrete case. An argument in favour of discussing inability first, as 
was done in this case, is obviously the political sensitivity of the issue of unwillingness. 
However, this paper will follow the text of the Rome statute and analyze unwillingness 
first. 
2.1.2.1. “Unwillingness” in light of the due process thesis 
The Statute outlines unwillingness in paragraph (2) of article 17; it is to be determined 
“having regard to the principles of due process recognized by international law”. When 
establishing the existence of unwillingness, the Court must take into account three 
situations delineated in paragraph (2), namely the purpose of shielding the person from 
criminal responsibility, unjustified delays inconsistent with the intent to bring the person 
to justice, and, finally, the dependence or partiality of the proceedings which had the same 
effect.  
The Statute uses the phrase “the Court shall consider”, but it does not provide a general 
clause at the end of the list, nor does it use phrases such as inter alia. Thus, although the 
matter is open to different interpretation,69 it seems that the list should be considered 
exhaustive, since unwillingness presents an exception that should be interpreted 
narrowly.70 In any case, the notion of unwillingness refers to the purpose with which 
national proceedings are conducted, i.e. subjective motives underlying the proceedings.71 
                                                        
67 Supra, part 2.1.1. of this Article. 
68 Since the Pre-Trial Chamber left the notion of unwillingness out of the discussion and dealt only with the 
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69 For an overview, see Pichon, 2008, p. 191. 
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The Informal Expert Paper provides a list of factors that may be relevant for determining 
unwillingness.72 At the outset, it points to the relevant background context issues, such 
as: separation of powers, including the powers attributed to institutions of the criminal 
justice system; degree of de jure and de facto independence of the judiciary, prosecutors, 
investigating agencies; privileges and immunities of State authorities; the legal regime of 
access to evidence, of extradition, of asylum, of due process standards, the rights of the 
accused, procedures; security conditions for witnesses and investigators, access to the 
scene of crime.73 It further points to examples of relevant facts and evidence that may be 
gathered, such as: delays in various stages of the proceedings compared with normal 
delays in that national system for cases of similar complexity, or patterns of political 
interference in investigation and prosecution and of trials reaching preordained 
outcomes.74 
While there are various interesting issues regarding unwillingness, one deserves special 
attention – the issue of due process rights and “all too willingness”. It is questionable 
whether a case can be admissible before the Court if there is a danger that national 
proceedings are being conducted in violation of due process, defence rights or other rights 
of the accused. Could a State admissibility challenge be dismissed on these grounds, and, 
if so, would the grounds fall under unwillingness or inability?  
The “due process thesis” advances the view that a State can be declared “unwilling or 
unable” on grounds of due process violations disadvantageous for the defendant.75 It is 
most frequently justified on the basis of the chapeau phrase “having regard to the 
principles of due process recognized by international law”, but some scholars also rely on 
subparagraphs (b) and (c) of article 17(2) of the Rome Statute.76 To consider whether this 
theory can be accepted, we must first focus on the principles of due process contained in 
the chapeau of paragraph (2) and then on the expressly enumerated situations, the third 
of which includes the need for independent and impartial proceedings.  
The chapeau phrasing of article 17(2), that the Court shall consider the three situations 
having regard to due process, would suggest that due process considerations may come 
into play in the context of specifically enumerated situations.77 In light of this, it would 
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March 2009, pp. 28 -31. 
73 Ibid., p. 28. 
74 Ibid., p. 29. 
75 Heller, Kevin John, The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The Effect of Article 17 of the Rome Statute on 
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seem that “violations of fair trial rights other than the independence and impartiality of 
the judiciary cannot lead to the admissibility of a case before the ICC”.78 
Turning to the enumerated situations, it is obvious that the provisions on unwillingness 
were construed primarily to prevent sham proceedings designed to protect persons 
responsible for international crimes. This was logical and necessary to ensure that States 
do not attempt to conduct false proceedings against responsible persons with the 
consequence of a case being inadmissible before the ICC, as evident from the words 
“inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice”. Hence, it is 
uncontroversial that both textual and teleological interpretations of relevant statutory 
provisions support the conclusion that such sham proceedings cannot form a basis for the 
inadmissibility of a case before the ICC.79 On the other hand, when it comes to violations 
disadvantageous to the defendant, such as denial of the right to legal representation, of 
equality of arms, of the right to examine witnesses and of the right to an impartial and 
independent tribunal, both textual and teleological interpretations of article 17 (2) (b) 
and (c) suggest a different conclusion: such violations should not be considered a reason 
for a case to be admissible before the Court. Even the text of subparagraph (c), which 
stresses independence and impartiality, requires in addition that the proceedings were 
conducted or are being conducted in a manner which is inconsistent with the intent to 
bring the person concerned to justice. Both requirements need to be fulfilled.80 Rojo notes 
that the “expression ‘intent to bring the person concerned to justice’ must be referring to 
the ‘intent to hold somebody accountable’ (result)”.81 He further argues that it is only 
where such intent is missing on the part of the relevant State that the Court must 
intervene in order to hold the person accountable and put an end to impunity.82 From this 
it would follow that violations of fair trial rights at the domestic level disadvantageous to 
the defendant would not lead to a case being admissible before the Court under the 
heading of unwillingness.  
The same conclusion is supported by a number of scholars, who seem to hold that 
violations of due process may never affect admissibility, not even on grounds of State 
inability. For example, Pichon argues that the “complementarity principle does not apply 
to violations of the right to independent and impartial proceedings which are 
disadvantageous to the accused”.83 Heller agrees, summarizing his findings in the 
following manner: “[P]roperly understood, article 17 permits the Court to find a State 
‘unwilling or unable’ only if its legal proceedings are designed to make a defendant more 
difficult to convict. If its legal proceedings are designed to make the defendant easier to 
convict, the provision requires the Court to defer to the State no matter how unfair those 
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proceedings may be”.84 Rojo concludes “if the object and purpose of the Statute is the 
establishment of an international criminal court that complements national efforts to put 
an end to impunity for international crimes, only domestic proceedings which are delayed 
or are not impartial or independent in order to shield the person concerned from criminal 
responsibility are relevant to the ICC”.85 
However, it seems that the Court is currently leaning towards the acceptance of the due 
process thesis or is at least sympathetic to it. In the case of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the 
Appeals Chamber emphasized that article 21 (3) of the Statute makes the interpretation 
as well as the application of the law applicable under the Statute subject to internationally 
recognized human rights.86 The Appeals Chamber, further, importantly recognized that 
“[h]uman rights underpin the Statute; every aspect of it, including the exercise of the 
jurisdiction of the Court. Its provisions must be interpreted and more importantly applied 
in accordance with internationally recognized human rights; first and foremost, in the 
context of the Statute, the right to a fair trial, a concept broadly perceived and applied, 
embracing the judicial process in its entirety.”87 Notwithstanding the fact that this 
decision is not directly connected to the issue of complementarity, it provides an insight 
into the direction the Court might take in the future.  
In fact, in its most recent decision in the Libyan case, the Court explicitly took into account 
fair trial considerations precisely in the context of admissibility and complementarity. Yet, 
the Court analyzed the issue of fair trial for Mr. Gaddafi in Libya not within the notion of 
“unwillingness”, which was not addressed at all, but within the assessment of Libyan 
ability to carry out proceedings in accordance with Libyan law.88 
2.1.2.2. “Inability” to genuinely carry out the proceedings 
In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court is instructed to consider 
whether a State is unable to obtain the accused or evidence or is otherwise unable to carry 
out its proceedings (article 17 (3) of the Rome statute). Pursuant to article 17(3) of the 
Statute, such inability of a State must stem from a “total or substantial collapse or 
unavailability of its national judicial system”. Some argue that the wording of the 
provision implies that “only one kind of collapse or unavailability would satisfy article 
17(3): namely, the kind that prevents a State from effectively investigating or prosecuting 
the accused”.89 The Informal Expert Paper seems to endorse this view by proposing the 
following factors for the assessment that a national judicial system has collapsed or has 
become unavailable: lack of necessary personnel, judges, investigators, prosecutor or of 
judicial infrastructure; lack of substantive or procedural penal legislation rendering the 
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system “unavailable”; lack of access rendering the system “unavailable”; obstruction by 
uncontrolled elements rendering the system “unavailable”; and amnesties or immunities 
rendering the system “unavailable”.90 
It has been argued, and it could be concluded from the list above, that inability may result 
from the absence or inadequacy of substantive legislation, especially when a State’s 
criminal legislation does not correspond to the substantive provisions of the Rome 
Statute, so an international crime can only be prosecuted as an ordinary one.91 However, 
this is highly controversial. As has been explained above, the absence of specific 
provisions on international crimes in national legislation has not been seen as 
determinative when trying to establish whether the same case is being investigated at the 
national level.92 In other words, to the extent that it covered the same conduct, a domestic 
investigation or prosecution for “ordinary crimes” has been deemed sufficient, and the 
lack of incriminations, such as crimes against humanity in national legislation, has not 
rendered the case automatically admissible before the Court.93 Hence, it would be 
inconsistent to conclude the opposite when establishing the second prong of 
complementarity, i.e. inability to carry out the proceedings. 
The determination of inability, as that of unwillingness, also raises a number of questions. 
One of the most interesting ones is again to what extent due process considerations 
should impact on the assessment of inability. For sure, the acceptance of the due process 
thesis requires an extensive interpretation, one prone to most of the already expressed 
objections. The statement that “fair trial concerns are both a symptom of a substantially 
collapsed justice system and, particularly when systematic, can cause the substantial 
collapse of the justice system”94 is perhaps going too far. Claiming that every national 
judicial system that does not provide certain due process or fair trial rights has collapsed 
or is unavailable seems too harsh.95 Even the most developed western states often breach 
some fair trial rights and that fact alone would certainly not per se render a case 
admissible before the ICC. The European Court of Human Rights has found a number of 
violations of some of the fair trial rights in most European states, and in some even on a 
regular basis (repeated/systematic violations or cases revealing structural problems);96 
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yet the proposition that those judicial systems should be found collapsed or unavailable 
is implausible.  
Still, this seems to be the path implicitly taken by the Court in the recent decision in the 
Libyan admissibility challenge. Libya has been found to be unable genuinely to carry out 
the investigation or prosecution against Mr. Gaddafi, so the Court did not address the 
alternative requirement of “willingness” and, within it, the issues raised by the Defence 
about the impossibility of a fair trial for Mr. Gaddafi in Libya. To begin with, the Defence 
argued that Mr. Gaddafi would be denied the right to a trial within reasonable time before 
an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.97 The Defence indicated that 
the actions and statements of Libyan officials not only violated the presumption of his 
innocence, but created a “presumption of guilt” and “reveal[ed] the extent of 
inappropriate executive influence over the case”.98 Further, the Defence argued that Mr. 
Gaddafi’s minimum defence rights would not be guaranteed in Libya. It was specified that 
he was not notified about the nature of the charges against him,99 that he was not given 
adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence (manifested in the refusal 
to ensure privileged communication with the Defence and the seizure of privileged 
defence documents),100 and was not ensured legal assistance of his own choosing.101 
Finally, the Defence submitted that Libya had failed to ensure Mr. Gaddafi access to 
investigative materials and the right to confront witnesses against him.102 
The Pre-Trial Chamber has discussed some of these fair trial considerations, particularly 
the right to have a defence counsel appointed, in the context of determining Libya's ability 
genuinely to investigate or prosecute the case.103 The Pre-Trial Chamber attached 
significant weight to the existing difficulties in securing a lawyer for the suspect. It also 
questioned Libya’s capacity to obtain necessary testimonies and provide adequate 
protection for witnesses in favour of Mr. Gaddafi.104 
The Pre-Trial Chamber has assessed Libya's capacity to investigate in accordance with the 
Libyan Code of Criminal Procedure, Libya's Constitutional Declaration and various human 
rights instruments that have been ratified by Libya. As the Pre-Trial Chamber has 
explicitly stated, “[t]his assessment has been pertinent because those issues impact on 
Libya's ability to carry out its proceedings in accordance with Libyan law”.105 What seems 
to flow from this assertion is that the ability of a State genuinely to carry out an 
investigation or prosecution depends on the degree of development of its criminal justice 
system. The Court itself emphasized that a state’s ability “must be assessed in the context 
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of the relevant national system and procedures”.106 This would seem to mean that for the 
assessment of ability it is not decisive whether a State respects international standards of 
human rights protection, but whether it adheres to its own substantive and procedural 
norms. Such interpretation of ability that could, perhaps, be deduced from the wording 
“collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system”, may have serious consequences. 
In the case of Libya, which has implemented international standards of fair trial in its own 
legislation, the Court’s approach to the issue of ability did not seem to cause problems, as 
Libya`s difficulties lie in the implementation of its substantive and procedural law, 
including human rights instruments. However, one may question the aptness of this 
approach in general, when it comes to States that have not ratified relevant human rights 
instruments, or whose substantive or procedural norms are otherwise substandard to 
western ideals. Whether those States could be seen as able to genuinely carry out the 
proceedings, although the rights available to the accused would be limited and would not 
reach the threshold necessary to qualify the proceedings as fair, is not clear. 
Finally, one may also wonder about the role of the term “genuine” in the text of article 17 
(1) (a) and (b), which specify the second “fold” of the complementarity test “unless the 
State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution” and 
“unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to 
prosecute”. The importance of genuineness as a factor in the discussion on the role of fair 
trial rights in the complementarity regime is even less clear than the answer to whether 
those rights are contained within unwillingness and inability. In any case, acceptance of 
the view that a violation of the accused person’s fair trial rights might lead to a case being 
investigated and prosecuted by the ICC, as opposed to being declared inadmissible, 
requires an extensive interpretation of the Statute and cannot easily find support in the 
current provisions on complementarity.  
3. CONCLUSION 
Complementarity, as a principle that regulates the relationship between the Court and the 
States, has far reaching consequences. Despite the fact that many issues important for 
determining whether a concrete case is admissible before the Court on the basis of 
complementarity are still only vaguely defined, there is no doubt that national 
proceedings concerning the same case must be ongoing. The existence of such 
proceedings is seen as a prerequisite for the discussion about unwillingness and/or 
inability. This seems logical and fully supported by the text of the Statute, regardless of 
the problems surrounding the interpretation of the “case” and the same person/same 
conduct test. What still presents a great challenge for the Court, and due to sensitive 
political implications will most likely continue to do so in the future, is the meaning of the 
notions of “unwillingness” and “inability”.  
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The current statutory framework does not unequivocally support the interpretation that 
violations of due process disadvantageous for the accused can constitute a ground for a 
finding of unwillingness and thus for the admissibility of a case. The inability clause leaves 
more leeway, but such an interpretation of admissibility provisions seems rather 
extensive. The ICC is not a human rights court nor does it have a mandate to oversee 
fairness of procedure in its Member States. Still, to completely ignore fair trial rights and 
other basic human rights of the accused would substantially invalidate the purpose of the 
Court and undermine the fundamental values which led to its constitution. It seems that 
the ICC took that into account when delivering the latest decision in the Libya case. 
However, a more comprehensive approach should be developed, having in mind the 
didactic role of international criminal judiciary,107 as well as the fact that the application 
of the principle of complementarity will shape future prosecution of international crimes. 
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Sažetak 
NAČELO KOMPLEMENTARNOSTI U PRAKSI  
MEĐUNARODNOG KAZNENOG SUDA 
Načelo komplementarnosti jedno je od najvažnijih načela koja uređuju djelovanje 
Međunarodnog kaznenog suda. Svrha je tog načela razgraničiti jurisdikciju Suda od 
jurisdikcije država. Međutim, unatoč relativno jasnim smjernicama iz članka 17. Rimskog 
statuta, primjena načela u praksi se pokazala problematičnom. Autorice analiziraju razvoj 
dvostrukog testa u praksi Međunarodnog kaznenog suda počinjući od zahtjeva 'postupka 
u tijeku' i nastavljajući do pojmova nevoljkosti i nesposobnosti. Poseban naglasak stavljen 
je na pitanje pravičnog suđenja i kontroverznu tvrdnju da bi nepravični postupci na 
nacionalnoj razini trebali, sami po sebi, učiniti predmet dopuštenim pred MKS-om. 
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